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FOREWORD 
The acid rain problem has recently captured the interest of researchers from all over the 
world. For a good number of years, IIASA has played a leadership role in researching the 
impacts of air pollution, in particular through the development of the RAINS model. 
The present research paper addresses the important issue of building a decision support 
component for analyzing the complicated transboundary problem of balancing the 
deposition levels of sulphur in Europe and the costs associated with reducing sulphur 
emissions. The interactive nonlinear multicriteria package DIDAS-N, which was in part 
developed within the SDS program at IIASA, is used to illustrate the relevant concepts. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Science Program 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the acid rain problem in Europe is discussed, stressing the transboundary 
tradeoffs between abatement costs of sulphur emission reduction and corresponding 
deposition levels in the different countries. An interactive decision support methodology 
is proposed which utilizes a powerful nonlinear multicriteria software package to evaluate 
various scenarios and tradeoffs. The concepts are illustrated using previously published data. 
The results from the tradeoff analysis show that reasonable deposition levels can be reached 
with limited transfers of funds between countries. The extent of these transfers can be 
controlled by selecting appropriate target levels for the criteria across countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays acid rain is one of the major environmental concerns in Europe. Yet, as many 
other problems, the problem of acid rain is not new. Over 300 years ago, the English 
nobleman John Evelyn presented an essay titled "Fugifugium or the Inconvenience of the 
Aer and Smoake of London Dissipated, together with some Remedies Humbly Proposed,"to 
King Charles I1 (Evelyn 1661). In his essay, Evelyn already proposed the theory that 
sulphur originating from smoke caused by burning coal turns silver black and destroys iron 
and stone. In the following centuries the awareness of this problem has grown, and more 
and more has been done to avoid the negative impacts of pollution, especially at the local 
and regional level. 
Over the last few decades the scale of environmental problems has shifted dramatically from 
the local and regional level to a continental (acid rain) and global (greenhouse effect) level. 
The primary reason for this shift is the fact that the problem has now become 
transboundary, in that emissions in one country affect the environmental quality in other 
countries, and at the same time the environmental quality in a given country is affected by 
emissions from other countries. 
In this paper the focus is on acid rain in Europe, and more specifically on the 
transboundary problem of tradeoffs between and balancing of costs and benefits of 
abatement policies across countries in Europe. The costs of emission reduction consist of 
the expenses associated with abating air pollution originating from sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
and nitrogen oxides (NO,). Power plants, oil refineries and other industries, as well as 
transportation and the domestic sector are to a large extent responsible for these emissions. 
The benefits of abatement measures include decreased damage to materials, buildings and 
ecosystems, particularly forests and aquatic systems. 
For several reasons it is difficult to balance costs and benefits of emission reduction. The 
first reason is that costs and benefits may not accrue to the same country, so that the acid 
rain problem calls for international environmental policies and negotiations in order to 
determine how much each country should abate and how much each country should pay for 
abatements in other countries. The second reason complicating the analysis is that benefits 
cannot easily be expressed in terms of monetary figures, so that preferably a comparison 
of costs and benefits would involve direct tradeoffs in relevant physical units. 
The purpose of our paper is to gain insight into the decision dynamics of this complicated 
problem, by exploring the nature of tradeoffs between abatement, the associated costs 
incurred by each country, and deposition levels throughout Europe. In order to analyze this 
issue, we utilize a simplified version of RAINS (Regional Acidification Information and 
Simulation) (Alcamo et a]. 1987), an integrated model which has been developed to link 
emissions and depositions in Europe, to provide the necessary data. The RAINS model can 
be used to simulate the effects of various different energy scenarios and abatement 
technologies. For our purpose, the information provided by RAINS relates on the one hand 
to estimates of the cost functions associated with abatement by each of the 27 European 
countries considered, and on the other hand to the effects in terms of deposition levels for 
various different abatement policies by these countries. A list of the 27 countries can be 
found in the first column of Table 1 below. 
The information provided by RAINS is used as input into an interactive multicriteria 
decision support system which serves to analyze the tradeoffs between various different 
policy scenarios, in terms of the cost and deposition levels for each country. In this 
system, the effects of various different target levels for the deposition and abatement costs 
for each country can be explored in one single interactive computer session. In this session, 
the decision maker modifies the target levels at each stage as he deems appropriate, after 
which the computer model calculates a new recommended solution based upon these 
modified values. 
Our approach differs from previous studies in that 1) benefits do not have to be expressed 
in terms of monetary units or utile values, 2) the abatement costs and depositions of each 
country can be considered separately, or alternatively groups of countries can be considered, 
3) the analysis is interactive, so that various different scenarios and tradeoffs can be 
evaluated in a short period of time, and 4) the effects of limited transfers of funds between 
countries on emissions and depositions can easily be calculated. Such limited transfers are 
more reasonable in practice than transfers of large amounts of money. Therefore, the 
contribution of this paper is that it provides a modeling framework in which the relevant 
tradeoffs between depositions and abatement costs for each of the 27 European countries 
can be analyzed interactively. Therefore, the model can serve as a decision support 
component in the process of establishing international environmental policies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the background of the acid rain 
problem and the RAINS model are discussed, followed by a presentation of the formal 
model formulation and the multicriteria decision support method. Next, our proposed model 
is illustrated by analyzing several scenarios and tradeoffs. Some extensions of our analysis 
and model formulation are suggested. The paper concludes with some final remarks. 
BACKGROUND 
Recently, a growing body of literature on the policy aspects of acidification has developed. 
This research can be divided into three types. 
The first type focuses on the costs and effects of certain specific emission reduction 
scenarios. For instance, Shaw, Amann and Schoepp (1988) compare a non-abatement 
scenario (also called official energy scenario) with among others a uniform 30 percent 
reduction scenario by 1993 at the latest, which scenario was considered in the SOz protocol 
of Helsinki 1985 (Hetttelingh and Hordijk 1987, p.39), and with current reduction plans as 
declared by the various countries. Shaw (1988) calculates costs associated with a uniform 
50 percent emission reduction and shows how depositions could futher be decreased by 
allocating the costs across countries in an optimal way in the sense that the total costs are 
minimized. This allocation of costs would involve a significant transfer of funds from 
Western European countries to Eastern European countries. Cesar and Klaassen (1989) 
estimate the deposition reductions and costs of the EC-directive (EEG 1988) on large 
combustion plants. One drawback of the above studies is that no interactive mechanism is 
used to evaluate alternative deposition and abatement cost levels. This makes "what-if type 
analyses difficult, so that the tradeoffs between various scenarios cannot easily be evaluated. 
In addition, these papers often stress the advantages of coordinated international actions 
using major transfers of funds from West to East (Shaw 1988). In reality, the scope of such 
transfers may be very limited. 
The second type of research emphasizes the welfare economic analysis of acid rain 
abatement (Maeler 1989; Van Ierland 1989). The distinguishing characteristic of this 
research is that costs of emission reductions as well as benefits of the corresponding 
improvement of ecosystems, materials and buildings are assessed in monetary terms. In 
particular for the benefits this is a cumbersome and controversial task, because the diversity 
of benefit components are difficult to express monetarily, and monetary benefits cannot 
easily be aggregated for all European countries. Maeler deals with this problem by 
assuming that marginal benefits are constant, and that the cost functions and expenditures 
are known. Assuming rational governments, he assesses the appropriate levels of costs and 
benefits by equating marginal costs and benefits. The assumption of constant marginal 
benefits, however, is questionable. Van lerland, on the other hand, uses an estimated 
piecewise linear benefit function for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In order 
to simplify the problem, he subsequently assumes the shape and values of the benefit 
functions for all other countries to be the same as for the FRG. It is obvious that an 
analysis in which deposition reductions are expressed in physical terms is preferred to the 
approach in the above studies where benefit functions are estimated in monetary values. 
The third type of research focuses on policy implications, using either upper bounds or 
target values for the deposition levels in the various countries. We mention two studies in 
this class. Van Ierland (1989) deals with the ecologically oriented critical loads approach. 
The critical load represents the highest level of adicification for which no major damage 
is done to the ecosystem in the long run. Looking at both sulphur and nitrogen, Van 
Ierland selects a critical load level of 1400 acid equivalents per hectare in his analysis. 
Klaassen and Jansen (1989) build a model using the political target approach. Concentrating 
on sulphur only, they take a target load of 3 grams of sulphur per square meter, which 
translates into approximately 1900 acid equivalents per hectare. A target load can be 
interpreted as an attainable and politically acceptable load for the intermediate term, the 
ultimate goal of course being the achievement of the critical loads. Given these loads, the 
costs and emission reductions needed to achieve these goals are calculated. As was the 
case with the first type of research, however, a drawback of these studies is that there is 
neither an explicit balancing of the tradeoffs between abatement costs and the benefits of 
corresponding lower depositions across countries, nor a user interactive tradeoff analysis. 
This paper extends the above types of research by concentrating on an interactive analysis 
of tradeoffs between deposition reduction and abatement costs across all 27 countries. It 
is clear that such an analysis is of a multicriteria nature. The powerful and interactive 
nonlinearmulticriteriaoptimization package IAC-DIDAS-N(Kreglewski, Paczynski, Granat 
and Wierzbicki 1988), also known as DIDAS-N, is used to perform this analysis. The 
analysis is performed without making the controversial step of trying to monetarize the 
benefits. Additionally, the advantages of cooperative action are stressed because the 
tradeoff analysis clearly indicates which countries might transfer limited amounts of funds 
to other countries. At the same time, by selecting reasonable ranges for the acceptable 
deposition levels and costs in the tradeoff analysis, the resulting solutions are such that none 
of the countries is assumed or required to pay unreasonable sums of money to other 
countries or to pay unreasonable domestic abatement costs. 
THE RAINS MODEL 
Before introducing the interactive decision support framework and the underlying model 
formulation, we briefly discuss the RAINS model which provides the cost estimates and the 
relevant air pollution transportation matrix. RAINS is an integrated model of acidification 
in Europe which describes the set of relations that link the generation of pollutants with 
their depositions, and thus with their adverse impacts on natural resources such as forests, 
groundwater and lakes. The emphasis of RAINS is on the transboundary aspects of air 
pollution (Alcamo et al. 1987). The model was developed at  the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) as a tool for evaluating control strategies. Currently the 
model is primarily sulphur-based, but nitrogen is presently being included and ammonia 
emissions may be included in the near future. The RAINS model can be run on an 
IBM/PC/XT/AT or compatible microcomputer. 
The parts of the model relevant for the purpose of this paper are the Energy Pathway, SO2 
Emissions, SO2 Transport (including deposition), and SO2 Control and Abatement Costs. In 
the Energy Pathway and SOz emissions submodels, different energy projections can be 
implemented. The submodel accounts for five emission-producing sectors: conversion (e.g., 
refineries), power plants, domestic, industrial and transportation. Eight fuel types are 
distinguished: brown coal, hard coal, derived coal (e.g., coke, brown coal briquettes), light 
oil (e.g., gasoline), medium destillate (gas oil), heavy oil, gas and other fuels (Alcamo et al. 
1987). The latter two are assumed to produce no sulphur emissions. Process emissions are 
taken into account as well when calculating the total emissions. 
Energy conservation, fuel substitution, the use of lower sulphur fuels and desulphurization 
are considered as means of emission reduction in the Pollution Control and Costs submodels 
of RAINS. Combustion modification, flue gas desulphurization and regenerative processes 
are considered as feasible technologies for desulphurization. Energy conservation is not yet 
included in the costs submodel of RAINS. Costs are based on country- and 
technology-specific parameters (Amann et al. 1987). The resulting cost coefficients 
incorporate the most important factors influencing abatement costs of the European 
countries in an internationally comparable way. The cost functions are piecewise linear, 
reflecting that in order to reduce emissions further, another technique may have to be 
applied with higher marginal abatement costs. 
The Transport submodel divides Europe into about 700 150x150 kilometer grids, and 
predicts sulphur concentration and deposition due to SO2 emission patterns on each of these 
grids. In doing so, the submodel uses source-receptor linkages from the long range 
atmospheric transport model, developed by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute under 
the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP) of the Economic Council of 
Europe (ECE) Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution. These source-receptor linkages 
combined determine the pollution transportation matrix. 
In the following, a simplified version of RAINS, due to Maeler (1989), is used. This 
simplification is a modification of RAINS in two respects. First, quadratic approximations 
are made of the stepwise linear cost functions of RAINS. Second, an aggregated 27x27 
transportation matrix, representing the sulphur transport between 27 European countries 
is used, rather than the 150x150 kilometer grids in the full-blown RAINS model. An 
advantage of this aggregation is that the tradeoff analysis is more straightforward. A 
disadvantage, however, is that the deposition levels in the aggregate model represent 
country-wide averages, so that the deposition effects on different ecosystems within a 
country cannot be analyzed explicitly. For a more detailed discussion of this simplified 
version and its drawbacks, the reader is referred to Maeler (1989). 
The output from the above submodels of RAINS serves as the input for the decision support 
model in which the interactive tradeoff analysis is conducted. It is possible to evaluate 
multiple scenarios generated using RAINS within the decision support framework. In the 
illustration below, one such scenario based on Maeler (1989) is used. 
MODEL FORMULATION 
To determine the tradeoffs between the deposition levels and abatement costs for each 
country, the transboundary relationships between SO2 emission, SO2 emission reduction, 
deposition of acid rain, and the associated domestic abatement costs for each of the 27 
countries can formally be stated as a nonlinear multicriteria mathematical programming 
problem. All monetary cost figures, emission data and deposition data in the remainder of 
this paper have been calculated on an annual basis. Denoting the surface of country i (in 
1,000 square kilometers) by s i  and the deposition in country i (in 1,000 tons) by d i ,  the 
decision problem for country i is by how much it should reduce its emissions ( r i )  in such 
a way that both domestic abatement costs c i ( r i )  and depositions in tons per square kilometer 
(or equivalently in grams per square meter) in country i (di /si)  are at an acceptable level. 
At the same time, depositions in country i are affected by emission reductions in other 
countries. As ceteris paribus lower abatement costs and deposition levels are preferred to 
higher levels, the two criteria for country i are to minimize z i l  = ci ( r i )  and zi2 - di/si. 
Therefore, the aggregate problem has a total of 27*2=54 separate criteria. Suppose we define 
the set of the 27 European countries by S. Then the mathematical formulation of the 
problem is as follows. 
Minimize z i l  = ci ( r i )  
Minimize zi2 di/si  
Subject to: 
for all i E S 
for all i E S 
for all i E S 
for all i E S 
where A = (a. .) is the 27x27 SO2 transportation matrix between the different countries, 
I J  
such that a. .  is the deposition in country i as a percentage of SO2 emissions in country j; 
1 J  
e i  represents the initial SO2 emission by country i (in 1,000 tons), i.e. the current emission 
level if a non-abatement strategy is adopted; and mi  represents the maximum 
technologically feasible emission reduction for country i as a precentage of ei .  Maeler 
(1989,p.14) indicates that the data on mi are based on information from IIASA. As 
mentioned before, following Maeler quadratic abatement cost functions of the form ci(ri) 
- a i r i  + Biri2 are used, where ai and Bi are scalar coefficients. The cost function estimates 
are based on the Energy Scenario 2000, and are expressed in million D-Marks. The emission 
and deposition data are based on 1984 energy consumption patterns (Maeler 1989, p.14). 
The relevant numerical data for our illustration are summarized in Tables I and 2. The SO2 
transportation matrix in Table 2 is adapted from Maeler (1989). 
Teble 1: Relevant Information on the 27 European Cocntries 
In addition to the above model restrictions, we will use policy target levels which seek to 
limit the abatement costs ci(r i)  of country i to a secific percentage pi of the annual GNP 
of country i, gi. The reference point method upon which the multicriteria decision support 
package DIDAS-N is based, is well-suited for utilizing such policy target levels in the form 
of aspiration levels and reservation levels for each of the criteria. The DIDAS-N 
methodology is presented next. 
Country Name 
(i) 
Albania 
Austria 
Belgiun 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
D e m r k  
Finland 
France 
German Dem.Rep. 
Fed.Rep. Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
I reland 
I t a l y  
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Soviet Union 
UnitedKingdm 
Yugoslavia 
Abbreviation 
ALE 
AUS 
EEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
CDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
I TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
ROM 
SPA 
SUE 
SU I 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
YUG 
Cost 
. 
Linear 
(ai 
1.25 
1.00 
2.00 
1.40 
1 .OO 
1.80 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
0.831 
0.60 
1.25 
1.05 
7.00 
2.50 
1.75 
0.85 
1.35 
1.15 
0.50 
2.50 
2.00 
1.25 
1.30 
1.30 
1.25 
Current 
Emissions 
(1,000 tons) 
(ei 
25 
147 
306 
500 
1,625 
151 
180 
1,015 
1,300 
1,375 
352 
825 
70 
1,900 
14 
170 
50 
2,050 
79 
100 
1,638 
165 
43 
483 
6,000 
1,845 
588 
Coefficients 
Quadratic 
(Bi 1 
.026 
.020 
. O M  
.0021 
.000283 
.0054 
.0175 
.0054 
.0005 
.00056 
.OOOO 
.000389 
.0100 
.0006 
.MOO 
.0076 
.I4627 
-000849 
-006196 
-000543 
.000668 
.05927 
.07133 
.000555 
.000141 
.OD0193 
.000483 
Maxinun 
Reduction 
(XI 
(mi) 
78 
77 
67 
a3 
75 
86 
85 
76 
80 
a6 
a6 
77 
82 
84 
90 
87 
73 
63 
89 
83 
82 
76 
55 
62 
76 
81 
79 
SNP (10 US$) 
(gi) 
N A 
70,640 
109,640 
37,390 
89,260 
61,520 
46,360 
601,560 
120,940 
758,480 
39,910 
20,650 
16,300 
359,210 
5,400 
155,740 
52,410 
139,780 
22,430 
50,870 
195,670 
114,150 
101,440 
61,610 
1,212,030 
467,880 
56,660 
Surface 
(1000 km2) 
(si) 
29 
84 
31 
1 1  1 
128 
43 
337 
547 
249 
108 
132 
93 
70 
301 
3 
4 1 
324 
313 
92 
238 
5 05 
450 
41 
461 
3,364 
244 
256 
Table 2: SO2 P o l l u t i o n  Transportat ion M a t r i x  f o r  the  27 European Countries 
f r a n  
t o ALE AUS EEL BUL CZE DEN FIN FRA GDR FRG GRE HUN IRE ITA LUX NET NOR POL POR ROM SPA SUE SUI TUR USS UNK YUG 
ALE 
AUS 
EEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
CDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
ITA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
ROM 
SPA 
SVE 
SUI 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
YUG 
.24 -01 .01 
.26 .01 .02 .01 .01 .01 .02 .02 -01 .04 .02 
.20 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 
.01 .30 .01 .01 .04 .01 .01 
.06 .01 .26 .01 .01 .04 .02 .06 .01 -01 .04 .01 .01 .02 
.20 .01 .01 .01 .01 
.O1 .33 .02 .04 .01 
.01 .08 .01 .O1 .35 .01 .04 .02 .03 .13 .04 .01 .04 .08 .03 .01 
.01 .02 .05 .02 .01 .27 .05 .02 .01 .01 
.04 .W .03 .02 .06 .05 .31 .01 .01 .01 .14 .09 .O1 .01 .07 .02 .01 
.05 .04 .26 .01 .O1 .01 
.04 .02 .01 .27 .01 .01 .02 .05 
.24 .01 
.02 .03 .01 .O1 .02 .01 .01 .35 .01 .07 .03 
.14 
.05 .01 .03 .22 .01 
.01 .03 .01 .01 .01 .01 .28 .03 .01 
-03 .02 .10 .03 .01 .ll .04 .04 .01 .02 .34 -01 .01 .01 .O1 .01 
.27 .O1 
.01 .05 .02 -01 .07 .01 .02 .35 .01 .05 
.02 .01 .08 .32 .O1 
.01 .01 .07 .04 .02 .02 .01 .W .01 .32 .O1 
.01 .01 .01 .02 .26 
.O1 .04 .03 .01 .33 .01 
.02 .04 .02 .05 .08 .07 .15 .01 .07 .04 .02 .W .01 .01 .03 .04 .14 .14 .08 .01 -03 .40 -02 .04 
.02 .01 .01 .01 .07 .02 .28 
.06 .05 .06 .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .06 .04 .01 .03 .01 .35 
MULTICRITERIA METHODOLOGY 
The nonlinear multicriteria system DIDAS-N 3.2 (Kreglewski, Paczynski, Granat and 
Wierzbicki 1988) can be run on an IBM/PC/XT/AT or compatible computer, so that the 
computer environment is the same as for the RAINS model. DIDAS-N uses a user-friendly 
spreadsheet format, and facilitates an interactive decision process which is based on the 
reference point method (Wierzbicki 1982, Lewandowski and Wierzbicki 1988a, 1988b). The 
methodology underlying DIDAS-N uses the concepts of satisficing solutions and bounded 
rationality (March and Simon 1958), and has been shown to be consistent with the process 
of human decision making. 
At each stage of the interactive process, the decision maker can specify aspiration and 
reservation levels for the criteria. The aspiration level of a criterion represents the level 
which the decision maker would like to achieve, if possible, and the reservation level is the 
worst level acceptable to the decision maker. The aspiration and reservation levels are also 
called reference points. DIDAS-N uses these specified reference point values as the basis 
for solving a multicriteria optimization problem to find a Pareto optimal or nondominated 
solution which reaches the aspiration levels of the criteria as closely as possible, while 
satisfying the reservation levels for the criteria, if possible. A solution is Pareto optimal if 
none of the criteria can be improved without sacrificing at least one of the remaining 
criteria. A detailed discussion of the reference point method can be found in Wierzbicki 
(1982) or the user manual of DIDAS-N (Kreglewski, Paczynski, Granat and Wierzbicki 
1988). For other more general overviews of multicriteria decision making techniques and 
concepts the interested reader is referred to Steuer (1986) and Yu (1985). 
At each iteration, the solution which is calculated using the specified aspiration and 
reservation levels of the criteria is presented to the decision maker, who can subsequently 
modify these levels according to his preferences and the information contained in the 
solution. In this way he is able to interactively explore various tradeoffs between the 
criteria. For instance, if the decision maker wishes to improve the deposition level in a 
given country, he can lower the aspiration or reservation level for this criterion (or both), 
and within the ranges of all other criteria the model will attempt to find a solution which 
reaches the aspiration level as much as possible. At any point of the analysis the decision 
maker can inspect and evaluate the relevant decision variables on the screen. It is also 
possible to graphically display the tradeoffs between the criteria in the form of bargraphs. 
Using the model formulation in (1) through (4), DIDAS-N first calculates the utopia and 
nadir values for the deposition and abatement cost criteria for each country. The utopia or 
selfish value of a criterion is its best possible value, ignoring all other criteria. Since the 
different criteria are conflicting, it is typically not possible to simultaneously attain the 
utopia values for all criteria. The nadir value of a criterion is defined by its worst possible 
value over the set of Pareto optimal solutions. It is very difficult to calculate the exact nadir 
values, so that DIDAS-N approximates them by the worst criteria values calculated during 
the analysis. The utopia and nadir values provide important information to the decision 
maker, because they define the relevant range of criteria values which should be considered 
in the tradeoff analysis. For instance, if the utopia value for deposition in France equals 
0.29 grams per square meter, then it  is unreasonable - within the structure and underlying 
asumptions of the current model - to strive for deposition levels of less than 0.29 grams per 
square meter. An illustration of the methodology follows next. 
ILLUSTRATION 
The utopia and nadir values for all 27 countries are given in Table 3. This table also shows 
the initial "neutral" solution and associated initial aspiration (Asp) and reservation (Res) 
levels which DIDAS-N suggests as a reasonable starting point for the interactive decision 
process. Before continuing the tradeoff analysis, we examine the results in Table 3 in more 
detail. It is clear that the utopia value for abatement costs ci(r i)  equals zero for each 
country, because the lowest possible costs are associated with the non-abatement strategy 
(r i  = 0). On the other hand, the cost functions are convex, so that the nadir value for 
abatement costs (cNi) is fouild by reducing domestic emissions to the maximum 
technologically feasible extent, implying r i  = mi*ei and thus cNi(ri)  = ci(misei). For 
instance, the maximum emission reduction for Ireland is rIRE = 0.82*70 = 57.4 (see Table 
I), so that its nadir cost value is cNIRt - 1.25.57.4 + o.olf(57.4)' - 104.7 million D-Mark. 
Similarly, the nadir value for deposition in each country is associated with the status quo 
of non-abatement, while the utopia value is reached if each country reduces emissions 
maximally. Again taking Ireland as an example, the SO2 transportation matrix in Table 2 
shows that dIRE = 0.24*eIRE + O.Ol*eUNK. Non-abatement would imply dIRE = 0.24*70 + 
0.01*1,845 = 35.25, so that the deposition in grams per square meter is given by dIRE/sIRE 
= 35.25/70 = 0.50, while the maximum abatement strategy would yield dIRE/sIRE =(0.24*(1 - 
0.82)*70 + 0.01*(1 - 0.81)*1,845)/70 = 0.09. These values can also be found in Table 3. 
Table 3: Utopia, Nadir Values, Aspiration, Reservation Values for  the I n i t i a l  (Neutral) Solution for 
the Unrestricted Model, A l l  27 Countries 
In the initial solution, throughout Europe abatement costs are quite low compared to their 
nadir values. Most deposition levels are at a moderate level, with the exeption of Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary and Poland. These 
countries have a deposition level of more than 2 grams per square meter. The deposition 
of 3.30 grams in Czechoslovakia is particularly high, considering that this level represents 
a country-wide average, so that certain parts of the country will have much higher pollution 
levels. The model in Table 3 is called the "unrestricted" model, because no "hard" constraints 
are used to limit abatement costs and deposition levels. 
C m t r y  
ALB 
AUS 
BEL 
NIL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
I TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
RW 
SPA 
SUE 
SUI 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
YUG 
As a first step to achieve deposition and cost levels within reasonable margins, the 
reservation levels suggested in the initial solution were uniformly changed to 2 grams per 
square meter for deposition and to 0.4 percent of GNP for abatement costs. None of the 
aspiration levels were changed. The GNP figures in Table 1 are in U.S. dollars, and the cost 
functions are expressed in D-Marks. For the purpose of our analysis, the GNP data were 
converted to D-Marks using a conversion rate of 2.5 D-Marks for 1 U.S. dollar. Of course 
conversion rates fluctuate considerably, so that this rate is not exactly correct. In our paper 
Costs (mi l l ion D-Hark) 
Utopia Asp Solution Res Nadir 
0 9.8 14.8 19.7 34.3 
0 89.4 134.1 178.8 369.4 
0 223.0 334.4 445.9 809.2 
0 298.2 447.3 596.5 942.7 
0 471.7 707.6 943.5 1,639.5 
0 89.4 134.1 178.8 324.9 
0 134.5 201.8 269.0 562.7 
0 1,094.3 1,641.5 2,188.7 4,756.1 
0 130.0 195.0 260.0 540.8 
0 207.6 311.4 415.2 783.7 
0 82.0 123.1 164.1 251.5 
0 159.9 239.8 319.7 538.2 
0 30.7 46.0 61.3 104.7 
0 958.7 1,438.1 1,917.4 3,204.1 
0 53.0 79.5 106.0 183.5 
0 139.1 208.7 278.2 536.0 
0 52.2 78.4 104.5 258.7 
0 681.3 1,022.0 1,362.7 2,515.4 
0 36.9 55.3 73.8 125.5 
0 25.1 37.7 50.2 99.2 
0 48.4 72.6 96.8 1,876.3 
0 276.1 414.2 552.3 1,245.5 
0 18.1 27.1 36.2 87.2 
0 132.6 198.8 265.1 424.2 
0 3,093.4 4,640.1 6,186.8 8,859.9 
0 739.7 1,109.5 1,479.4 2,373.0 
0 196.2 294.2 392.3 684.8 
2 Deposition (grems/m ) 
Utopia Asp Solution Res Nadir 
0.09 0.22 0.29 0.35 0.50 
0.54 1-10 1.38 1.66 2.37 
1.00 1.86 2.28 2.71 3.79 
0.29 0.67 0.87 1.06 1.59 
1.37 2.65 3.30 3.94 5.40 
0.22 0.58 0.76 0.94 1.40 
0.08 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.38 
0.29 0.57 0.71 0.85 1.22 
1.10 2.24 2.81 3.39 5.22 
0.57 1.23 1.55 1.88 3.01 
0.15 0.41 0.55 0.68 0.94 
0.86 1.78 2.23 2.69 3.71 
0.09 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.50 
0.45 1.06 1.36 1.67 2.56 
0.07 0.24 0.32 0.41 0.65 
0.53 1.28 1.66 2.03 2.99 
0.06 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.23 
1.17 1.93 2.31 2.69 3.72 
0.06 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.41 
0.27 0.53 0.67 0.80 1.09 
0.20 0.48 0.62 0.76 1.12 
0.11 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.42 
0.39 0.81 1.02 1.23 1.82 
0.15 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.43 
0.22 0.42 0.51 0.61 0.92 
0.44 1.03 1.33 1.62 2.28 
0.41 0.84 1.05 1.27 1.7'7 
the GNP data are only used for establishing reservation levels for abatement costs, so that 
a rough estimate of the conversion rate suffices. It is easy to repeat the analysis in our 
illustration using a different conversion rate, if this is desired. Since the reservation levels 
for all countries will be affected in the same proportion, the resulting solutions will likely 
be similar. Simply stated, the reservation level of 2 grams for the average deposition within 
each country can be viewed as a pollution load, above which the ecosystem would be badly 
disturbed. The purpose of selecting these reservation levels is to study how this deposition 
level of one country can be reached by additional emission reduction measures in another 
country, especially if this one country already has high abatement costs. The modified 
solution presented by DIDAS-N is given in Table 4. 
Table 4: Suggested Solution with Uniform Reservation levels, Unrestricted Model 
': The reservation level  could not be attained for  th is  country, using the current scenario. 
Country 
ALB 
AUS 
BEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
I TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
ROn 
SPA 
SUE 
SU I 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
YUG 
For several countries, the deposition and cost reservation levels could not be met. In the case 
of Czechoslovakia, both the deposition and cost reservation levels were not met, but the 
nadir value for abatement costs was not yet reached, so that this country could reduce its 
domestic depositions further, albeit at a great expense. Later we will address this issue in 
more detail. Countries such as Belgium, Hungary, the GDR and Poland, which had high 
deposition levels in the initial solution (see Table 3) now have greatly reduced deposition 
Costs (mi l l ion  D-Hark) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0 0.0 34.3 
0 369.4 706.4 
0 809.2 1,096.0 
0 173.6 373.9 
0 1,211.2' 892.6 
0 324.9 615.2 
0 0.0 463.6 
0 4,756.1 6,015.6 
0 540.8 1,209.4 
0 783.7 7,584.8 
0 0.0 399.1 
0 222.2' 206.5 
0 0.0 163.0 
0 3,204.1 3,592.0 
0 0.0 54.0 
0 536.0 1,557.0 
0 0.7 524.1 
0 1,540.6' 1,397.8 
0 0.0 224.3 
0 99.2 508.7 
0 25.9 1,956.7 
0 199.6 1,141.5 
0 87.2 1,014.4 
0 0.0 616.1 
0 3,267.4 12,120.3 
0 1,305.3 4,678.8 
0 554.8 566.6 
2 Deposit ion (grams/m ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0.09 0.46 2.00 
0.54 0.74 2.00 
1 .00 1.20 2.00 
0.29 1.21 2.00 
1.37 2.1P 2.00 
0.22 0.24 2.00 
0.08 0.31 2.00 
0.29 0.40 2.00 
1.10 1.29 2.00 
0.57 0.67 2.00 
0.15 0.88 2.00 
0.86 1.95 2.00 
0.09 0.38 2.00 
0.45 0.51 2.00 
0.07 0.65 2.00 
0.53 0.68 2.00 
0.06 0.11 2.00 
1.17 1.68 2.00 
0.06 0.40 2.00 
0.27 0.50 2.00 
0.20 1.03 2.00 
0.11 0.20 2.00 
0.39 0.39 2.00 
0.15 0.41 2.00 
0.22 0.56 2.00 
0.44 1.15 2.00 
0.41 0.68 2.00 
levels, but in the case of Poland at a cost exeeding the target level of 0.4 percent of GNP. 
In Table 4, Hungary has a reduced deposition level in spite of slightly lower domestic 
emission reductions than in the initial solution in Table 3. This is due to the increased 
emission abatement activities in surrounding countries. The reason why Hungary itself does 
not spend additional funds on abatement is that the current level in Table 4, 222.2 million 
D-Mark, already exeeds its reservation level of 0.4 percent of GNP, 206.5 million D-Mark. 
Interestingly, a number of Western European countries (e.g., FRG, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands) are at their nadir cost levels in Table 4, so that these 
countries are reducing their domectic emissions to the maximum feasible extent. The reason 
is that for these countries the 0.4 percent of GNP, used as the reservation level for 
abatement costs, far exeeds the nadir cost values. Thus, given the 0.4 percent reservation 
level, it is reasonable to assume that these countries might be willing to transfer limited 
funds to other countries which have not yet reached their technological emission reduction 
limits, but have already exeeded their cost reservation levels. 
As a futher exercise, we divided Europe into Eastern Europe (the COMECON countries, 
Albania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) and Western Europe (The European Community, the 
Nordic countries, Austria and Switzerland). The deposition reservation levels for the Eastern 
European countries were kept at 2 grams per square meter, but for the Western countries 
these levels were tightend to 1 gram. The latter level of 1 gram comes closer to the actual 
critical load. At the same time, in order to obtain more realistic results the reservation levels 
for abatement costs were lowered from 0.4 percent to 0.2 percent of GNP for Eastern 
Europe. The levels for the Western countries were kept at 0.4 percent. Table 5 has the 
revised solution. 
In four Eastern European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia) and 
in Luxembourg, the cost targets were not met, and in addition the deposition level of 2 
grams was not reached in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Comparing Tables 4 and 5, we see 
that relaxing the reservation levels for abatement costs leads the Eastern European countries 
to spend less money on emission reduction, and as a result depositions are generally higher 
in Table 5. On the other hand, many of the Western European countries were already 
spending relatively high amounts of money in the solution of Table 4, and spend even more 
in that of Table 5, in order to reach the tighter deposition reservation level of 1 gram per 
square meter. A good example of this increased effort is the case of Luxembourg, which 
spends little money under the 2 gram scenario, but spends 123.4 million D-Mark in the 1 
gram scenario. In fact, this additional expense is a sacrifice by Luxembourg to aid Belgium 
in reducing its deposition level from 1.20 in Table 4 to 1.0. Note that Belgium itself cannot 
spend more than it is already doing (809.2 million D-Mark). If such a sacrifice by 
Luxembourg is considered unreasonable, the model can easily be modified to set a limit to 
the sacrifice by Luxembourg. In our illustration this was not done. 
Teble 5: Suggested Solut ion wi th D i f fe ren t  Reservation Levels f o r  Eastern and Uestern Europe, 
Unrestr ic ted Model 
Costs ( m i l l i o n  D-Mark) I 2 I c M t r Y  I Deposition (gram/m I 
ALB 
AUS 
BEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
I TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
I 
POL 
POR 
ROM 
SPA 
SUE 
SUI 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
Y UG 
*: The reservation level  could not be at ta ined f o r  t h i s  cwnt ry ,  using the current scenario. 
Aspi rat ion Solut ion Reservation 
It is of interest to see wheter it is possible (feasible) to impose a "hard" restriction of at most 
2 grams per square meter on the deposition level in each country. Such a hard restriction 
(upper bound) differs from a reservation level in that reservation levels do not have to be 
reached at any price, but no feasible solution exits if an upper bound cannot be satisfied, 
and the mathematical program cannot be solved without relaxing some of these bounds. 
Table 6 gives the results from solving the revised model with uniform reservation levels of 
2 grams for deposition and 0.4 percent of GNP for abatement costs. We call this the 
"restricted" model because of the "hard" constraints mentioned above. 
Aspirat ion Solut ion Reservation 
Due to imposing the upper bounds, the utopia values for the criteria in Table 6 are slightly 
different from the previous Tables. In particular, the lowest feasible abatement costs for 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland are considerable. As expected, all deposition 
levels in the solution of Table 6 are now at most 2 grams per square meter, and 
Czechoslovakia is the only country which is exactly at its upper bound. Note that the 
surrounding countries are forced to major expenditures in order to force the deposition level 
in Czechoslovakia down to 2 grams. Czechoslovakia itself, however, is not spending more 
in the restricted solution of Table 6 than in its unrestricted counterpart of Table 5, because 
it was already spending considerably in excess of its reservation level 892.6 million D- 
Mark. Similar to the situation described above for Luxembourg in Table 5, if it is deemed 
appropriate for Czechoslovakia to spend more on reducing its domestic emission, either its 
abatement cost reservation level can be increased or a "hard" lower bound on its abatement 
expenditures can be imposed. 
Teble 6:  Suggested Solution u i t h  Uniform Reservation Levels for  A l l  27 European Cwntr ies,  
Restricted Model 
*: The reservation level  could not be attained for  t h i s  cwntry,  using the current scenario. 
Country 
AL B 
AUS 
BEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
I RE 
1 TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
ROM 
SPA 
SUE 
SUI 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
YUG 
I 
The restricted model with "hard" upper bounds of 2 grams for depositions in each country 
was also re-solved using the scenario of Table 5 with different reservation levels for Eastern 
( 2 grams, 0.2 percent of GNP) and Western ( 1 gram, 0.4 percent of GNP) European 
countries. The results in Table 7 show that two countries, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, are 
exactly at the upper bound of their deposition level. Comparing Table 7 with Table 5, we 
Costs (mi l l ion  D-Mark) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0 3.1 34.3 
0 369.4 706.4 
0 809.2 1,096.4 
0 192.2 373.9 
1,185.1 1.185.1' 892.6 
0 324.9 615.2 
0 92.5 463.6 
0 4,502.9 6,015.6 
210.3 540.8 1,209.4 
0 783.7 7,584.8 
0 79.0 399.1 
184.0 249.7* 206.5 
0 2.1 163.0 
0 2,556.7 3,592.1 
0 9.0 54.0 
0 536.0 1,557.4 
0 2.6 524.1 
581.6 2,515.4' 1,397.8 
0 0.1 224.3 
0 99.2 508.7 
0 708.8 1,956.7 
0 95.9 1,141.5 
0 87.2 1,014.4 
0 96.0 616.1 
0 4,607.5 12,120.3 
0 1,478.3 4,678.8 
0 684.8' 566.6 
2 Deposition (grams/m ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0.34 0.41 2.00 
0.69 0.74 2.00 
1.04 1.18 2.00 
0.83 1.16 2.00 
1.63 2.00 2.00 
0.22 0.24 2.00 
0.24 0.24 2.00 
0.33 0.38 2.00 
1.17 1.26 2.00 
0.60 0.66 2.00 
0.61 0.67 2.00 
0.96 1.80 2.00 
0.15 0.36 2.00 
0.67 0.75 2.00 
0.07 0.60 2.00 
0.56 0.66 2.00 
0.09 0.09 2.00 
1.26 1.30 2.00 
0.30 0.33 2.00 
0.34 0.45 2.00 
0.60 0.61 2.00 
0.13 0.19 2.00 
0.48 0.50 2.00 
0.33 0.35 2.00 
0.46 0.46 2.00 
0.47 1.03 2.00 
0.50 0.58 2.00 
see that the deposition reduction from 2.67 to 2.0 grams in Czechoslovakia is in part due to 
a considerable abatement increase by Poland. 
Teble 7: Suggested Solution u i t h  Di f ferent  Reservation Levels for  Eastern and Western Europe, 
Restricted Model 
*: The reservation level  could not be attained for th is  country, using the current scenario. 
Country 
ALB 
AUS 
BEL 
BUL 
CZE 
DEN 
FIN 
FRA 
GDR 
FRG 
GRE 
HUN 
IRE 
I TA 
LUX 
NET 
NOR 
POL 
POR 
ROn 
SPA 
SUE 
SU I 
TUR 
USS 
UNK 
Y UG 
The above analyses show that a limited transfer of money from a country spending less 
than given target amount to a country spending more, might be resonable. The extent of 
such transfers can be controlled by manipulating the aspiration and reservation levels for 
the criteria. These limited transfers are different from the transfers proposed by Maeler 
(1989) and by Bergman, Cesar and Klaassen (1989), in that our solutions suggest only few 
countries receive a payment and the amounts are much lower. A drawback of our solutions 
is that abatements are not always done in the most cost-efficient way. On the other hand, 
the smaller transfers involved may render the solutions more realistic. 
As a last case we study the situation where Belgium and the Netherlands want to limit 
depositions to at most 1 gram. For the remaining 25 countries, the aspiration and reservation 
levels suggested in the initial "neutral" solution by DIDAS-N were used. The results for 
Belgium and the Netherlands from the initial "neutral" solution for the unrestricted model 
in Table 3 are repeated in Table 8. In this solution, the deposition levels suggested by 
DIDAS-N for Belgium (2.28 grams) and the Netherlands (1.66 grams) are rather high, and 
Costs (mi 11 ion D-Hark) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0 12.9 34.3 
0 369.4 706.4 
83.5 809.2 1,096.4 
0 342.7. 187.0 
1,185.1 1,207.1' 446.3 
0 324.9 615.2 
0 34.3 463.6 
0 4,706.1 6,015.6 
210.3 540.8 604.7 
0 783.7 7,584.8 
0 87.8 399.1 
184.0 195.1' 103.3 
0 7.3 163.0 
0 3,204.1 3,592.1 
0 9.8 54.0 
0 536.0 1,557.4 
0 1.6 524.1 
581 -6  2,515.4' 698.9 
0 16.5 224.3 
0 99.2 254.4 
0 689.6 1,956.7 
0 59.2 1,141.5 
0 87.2 1,014.4 
0 49.4 308.1 
0 4,578.0 6,060.2 
0 2,334.6 4,678.8 
0 684.8' 283.3 
Deposition (grems/m 2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation 
0.34 0.38 2.00 
0.69 0.69 1.00 
1.04 1 .OO 1.00 
0.83 1.42 2.00 
1.63 2.00 2.00 
0.22 0.24 1.00 
0.24 0.27 1 .OO 
0.33 0.32 1 .OO 
1.17 1.21 2.00 
0.60 0.60 1.00 
0.61 0.68 1 .OO 
0.96 1.97 2.00 
0.15 0.27 1.00 
0.67 0.48 1 .OO 
0.07 0.59 1 .OO 
0.56 0.53 1 .OO 
0.09 0.09 1 .OO 
1.26 1.28 2.00 
0.30 0.30 1 .OO 
0.34 0.48 2.00 
0.60 0.61 1 .OO 
0.13 0.20 1 .OO 
0.48 0.39 1 .OO 
0.33 0.38 2.00 
0.46 0.46 2.00 
0.47 0.47 1 .OO 
0.50 0.57 2.00 
the abatement costs are much below both the nadir values and the reservation level of 0.4 
percent of GNP. Since in this section we want to focus on depositions, the aspiration and 
reservation levels for  abatement costs were kept at the levels suggested by DIDAS-N in the 
initial solution. This implies that the reservation levels for  abatement costs will be 
impossible to attain given our goal of lowering depositions. 
From Table 9 we see that in the scenario where the aspiration and reservation levels for  
depositions in the Netherlands are set equal to 1 gram, both Belgium and the Netherlands 
spend more money on reducing emissions than in the "neutral" solution: 550.2 million D- 
Mark versus 334.4 million for Belgium, and 391.4 million versus 208.7 million for  the 
Netherlands. Both these cost figures are at a moderate level compared to their nadir values 
of 809.2 and 536.0 million D-Mark, respectively. Table 10 shows the situation where the 
reference level for  deposition in Belgium is set equal to 1 gram. 
Teble 8: Neutral Solut ion f o r  Belgiun and the Netherlands, Unrestr icted Model 
Teble 9: Suggested Solut ion f o r  Belgiun and the Netherlands, Deposition Reservation Level 
i n  the Netherlands Equal t o  One 
Country 
BEL 
NET 
Teble 10: Suggested Solut ion f o r  Belgiun and the Netherlands, Deposition Reservation Level 
i n  Belgiun Equal t o  One 
Costs ( m i l l i o n  D-Mark) 
Aspi rat ion Solut ion Reservation 
223.0 334.4 445.9 
139.1 208.7 278.2 
Country 
BEL 
NET 
2 Deposition (grems/rn 
Aspi rat ion Solut ion Reservation 
1.86 2.28 2.71 
1.28 1.66 2.03 
As was noted before, Belgium has difficulties achieving such a deposition level without help 
from other countries. This is shown by its very high domestic abatement costs, equal to the 
Costs ( m i l l i o n  D-Mark) 
Aspi rat ion Solut ion Reservation 
223.0 550.2 445.9 
139.1 391.4 278.2 
Country 
BEL 
NET 
2 Deposition (grems/rn ) 
Aspirat ion Solut ion Reservation 
1.86 1.62 2.71 
1 .OO 1 .OO 1-00 
Costs (mi 11 i on  D-Mark) 
Aspi rat ion Solut ion Reservation 
223.0 809.2 445.9 
139.1 534.6 278.2 
2 Deposition (grams/m 
Aspirat ion Solut ion Reservation 
1 .OO 1 .OO 1 .OO 
0.13 0.53 2.03 
nadir value (809.2 million D-Mark). The Netherlands, on the other hand, helps Belgium by 
considerably reducing its emissions to 0.53 grams. The abatement costs to the Netherlands 
of 534.4 million D-Mark are quite high, and close to its nadir value of 536.0 million D- 
Mark. A reasonable conclusion is that perhaps Belgium might consider transferring a limited 
amount of money, not exeeding the differential effort by the Netherlands of 534.4 - 391.4 
= 143.0 million D-Mark, if Belgium insists on limiting its depositions to 1 gram per square 
meter. The extent of this transfer might be decided in international negotiations. Finally, 
Table 11 shows the results of setting the reference values for both Belgium and the 
Netherlands equal to 1 gram. Since the Netherlands have no problems attaining a deposition 
level below 1 gram, it is not surprising that the solution in Table 11 is very similar to that 
in Table 10. 
Table 11: Suggested Solution for  Belgiun and the Netherlands, Deposition Reservation Level 
for  Both Equal t o  One 
l ~ o u n t r y  1 Costs (mi l l ion  D-Mark) I 2 Deposition (grams/m ) I 
EXTENSIONS 
I 
The current model formulation can be extended in a number of ways. First, it is possible 
to focus on individual countries other than the ones selected in our illustration. Second, the 
model can easily be reformulated to consider blocks of countries with aggregate cost 
functions. Two such blocks which may be of interest are on the one hand the European 
Community, and on the other hand the COMECON countries. Game theoretic aspects of the 
model dynamics can be explored as well. 
A straightforward extension of the current formulation is to include nitrogen emissions in 
the model, and to consider Ph-levels rather than depositions due to SO2 emissions only. Such 
a model would involve a dynamic problem formulation, as the Ph-levels of the soil depend 
in part on the Ph-levels in the previous year. A pilot version of such a model formulation 
is already available as a demonstration problem on the DIDAS-N diskette (Kreglewski, 
Paczynski, Granat and Wierzbicki 1988, pp. 38-41). This example problem is of limited size 
(2 regions and 3 years), and is a simplified version of the model formulation by Hettelingh 
and Hordijk (1986). 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution Reservation 
Another extension would be to utilize a finer grid of source-receptor linkages in the 
analysis. The analysis in our current paper is very rough, because only information on 
country-wide average depositions was used. A finer grid would enable studying the effects 
of pollution on different ecosystems, and would enable the policy maker to establish tighter 
limits on those ecosystems which are particularly sensitive to pollution. 
FINAL REMARKS 
In this paper, a multicriteria framework was proposed to analyze tradeoffs between 
deposition levels and abatement costs within and across 27 European countries. The 
illustration clearly shows that it is possible to investigate numerous different scenarios where 
the criteria levels for various countries are restricted, using either "hard" constraints (upper 
bounds) or "soft" target values (aspiration and reservation levels). Rather than 
comprehensively analyzing policy and strategy issues, our purpose in the current paper was 
to emphasize these possibilities. The task of analyzing the pros and cons of different 
scenarios associated with the acid rain problem in Europe is a very complicated one. Our 
proposed methodology provides a useful decision support tool to aid policy makers in 
analyzing this problem. Of course our paper constitutes only a first attempt towards 
designing a true decision support framework, and much work is yet to be done along the 
lines of the extensions mentioned above. 
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